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In Quest of A Smart Neighborhood Strategy
How Should Be the Future Eastern Foreign 
Policy of Romania?
ŞERBAN FILIP CIOCULESCU
Since the end of Communism, each of the presidential administrations and the 
ministers of Foreign Affairs tried to forge and launch a new ”eastern foreign policy”, 
acknowledging the existence of historic threats and opportunities. The first democratic 
president, Ion Iliescu, remains in history as he tried to normalize relations with the 
Russian Federation by overcoming the thorny Soviet inheritance and the well-known 
Russo-phobia of many Romanians, while his successor Emil Constantinescu agreed to 
the signature of the bilateral treaty with Ukraine, in the hope of acceleration NATO 
membership. All the successive presidents were first careful to mention that their 
first priority in the East is to ”normalize” the relations with the Republic of Moldova, 
promoting the ”one nation two states” principle and preparing the field for a close 
relationship, and even for the scenario of the possible unification. Unfortunately, 
less attention was given to countries such as Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia, at 
least during the first post-communist decade. Only during the last ten years some 
improvements have been recorded such as the strategic partnership with Azerbaijan 
and the special relation with Georgia – Romania is one of the members of the ”New 
friends of Georgia” group of states.
When the new presidential administration of Traian Băsescu came in power at 
the end of 2004, there were real hopes for a new eastern foreign policy of Romania, as 
Traian Băsescu and his close advisers constantly spoke about Romania’s main interest 
in anchoring the Wider Black Sea Area to the West (namely the EU and NATO), and 
rebuilding the special relations with countries from the former Soviet space and from 
the Middle East. The main issued to be solved were the fate of Moldova and the issue of 
Transnistrean conflict, the still remaining contentious issues with Ukraine and Russia, 
the access to natural energy from Central Asia and the Caspian. Six years have passed 
since this moment and Romania, who became in 2007 a EU member, doesn’t looks like 
having resolved even the major part of this issues. In this study we want to investigate 
the evolutions of Romania’s relations with Republic of Moldova, Ukraine and Russia 
to see if there are really prospects for an active and constructive eastern policy to be 
integrated with the strategic profile of our country.
Redefining the Relation with Republic of Moldova
Romania and Moldova are both sovereign states, but they are inhabited by 
the same nation, the ”Romanians”, in spite of the fact that many Moldovans call 
themselves ”Moldovans” not Romanians, as an inheritance of Soviet times.
Romania was the first country to recognize the independence of Moldova in 
1990, and for a huge part of Romanians and Moldovans this was the first step towards 
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unification. Then, the political conflict in Transnistria generated the intervention of 
Russian forces and reduced the probability of this event. Since the end of the USSR, 
Romania and the Republic of Moldova oscillated between good and poor relations, 
depending on the leadership, the regional circumstances and some specific events.
Romania and Moldova developed a flourishing trade during the last 20 years, more 
and more people circulating across the borders and earning their bred by doing trade. 
On January 20, 1992, The Romanian embassy was opened in Chişinău.
For its part, the Republic of Moldova has hesitated since the mid-90s between 
hypothetical EU integration and membership in the CIS practice, reaching the sometimes 
contradictory official discourse of the doctrine of co-integration in EU and CIS. 
Political elites in Chişinău clearly experienced an identity crisis and still feel 
vulnerable to external power influences. They have sought to crystallize a foreign 
policy able to keep alive the two options: enhancing the membership in the CIS or 
approaching the West through EU membership. For example in 2002, the political 
scientist Vasile Stati, a doctrinaire of the communist regime in Chişinău, stated 
that Moldova should aim at the double relation (with Russia and the West), as the 
kingdom of Moldova did in 1475, by declaring itself a vassal to Poland and Hungary, 
and President Voronin did not hesitate to speak metaphorically about ”lamb/calf 
which is sucking from two sheep/cows”1.
If one examines quantitative data about Moldo-Romanian relations, the facts 
seem impressive: there are more than 104 bilateral agreements regarding issues of 
mutual interest have been signed, such as on mutual promotion and protection of 
investments, avoiding double taxation and preventing tax evasions, cooperation in 
transportation, postal services, telecommunications and tourism, facilitation of trade, 
customs services, science, education, culture and in many other important areas. 
Short of the much-debated bilateral treaty of friendship and cooperation, every other 
type of diplomatic document has been signed, including recently the bilateral trans-
border trade agreement. About 90% of the Moldovan goods have a free access on 
the Romanian market since the EU agreed to give to Chişinău Autonomous Trading 
preferences in January 2008. In 2008-2009, Romania was on the second place among 
the foreign trading partners of the Republic of Moldova for the exportations and third 
place for the imports2. For Moldova, Romania is the first trade partner with the EU.
Romania assumed, since the beginning of the 90s, the role of the country which 
constantly supports Republic of Moldova for integration first into the international 
community and then to the West. This is the reason why Bucharest encouraged 
and supported Chişinău for becoming a member of various organizations such as 
UNO, OSCE, the Council of Europe, Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe and now 
for the EU. Of course, because neutrality as a principle is present in the Moldova’s 
constitution, the Romanian authorities did not openly push for NATO membership 
but supported activities through Partnership for Peace. 
Between 1991 and 2001 it was an intense political, diplomatic and economic 
dialogue between the two countries. Petru Lucinschi, the Moldovan president, met 
Emil Constantinescu in 1998 and Ion Iliescu in 2001, minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei 
Pleşu visited his counterpart in Chişinău twice in 1998 etc.
1 Victor CHIRILĂ, ”Republic of Moldova Relations with Romania”, in Igor SAROV, Igor OJOG 
(eds.), The Foreign Policy of the Republic of Moldova (1998-2008), Cartdidact, Chişinău, 2010, p. 31.
2 The Republic of Moldova, http://www.mae.ro/index.php?unde=doc&id=5664&idlnk=
1&cat=3 (accessed on 3.07.2010). 
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In spite of some real elements of cooperation and good understanding, such as the 
opening of three joint checking points, the special economic zone Galaţi-Giurgiuleşti-
Reni, the participation of the two countries plus Ukraine in the two Euro-regions Lower 
Danube Region and Upper Prut Region, and the connection of Moldova to the Romanian 
power supply system, it is fair to mention also the points of contention: the non-
signature of the Treaty on Privileged Partnership and Cooperation between Moldova 
and Romania, the conflicts around the reconnaissance of the Patriarchy supported from 
Bucharest, the accusations of Romania’s interference in Moldova’s domestic affairs etc. 
The Romanian obsession with rejecting the bilateral basic treaty with Republic of 
Moldova became indeed an element of Romanian foreign policy doctrine. The Social 
Democrat Party of Romania denied the need for such a treaty between the years 2001-
2004, later the Băsescu PDL administration also said it was neither necessary, nor 
beneficial, because it could be seen as an attempt to legitimize the consequences of the 
Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact and the so-called ”Moldovan” language1. 
In 2001, the Moldovan Communist Party (CPRM) took the power in Chişinău 
and at the beginning heavily oriented the foreign policy towards greater integration 
within the CIS and towards special relations with Russia.
Experts in Moldovan and Romanian foreign policy speak about periods of 
tensions and period of pragmatism in the bilateral relations. 
In October 2001, Moldovan minister of Justice Ion Morei harshly criticized 
Romania before the European Court for Human Rights on the occasions of the 
hearings regarding the Metropolis of Bessarabia vs. the Government of Moldova. 
Only the episode of the ”Kozak Memorandum” in 20032 allowed for a relative 
normalization of the bilateral relations, when the Moldova’s relations with Russia 
worsened and Chişinău decided to go closer to the EU, thus temporary improved 
the relations with Romania in search of support3. Armand Goşu stated that this 
anti-Russian and pro-western turn of Moldova found Romanian decision-makers 
unprepared and without any reaction4.
1 Many times president Băsescu stated that Romania does not need such a treaty which 
would only legitimize the consequences of the Soviet-Nazi Pact and that he does not want to 
be ”the partner of Stalin”.
2 According to various Moldovan, Russian and European testimonies it seems that both 
EU and USA put pressure in 2003 on the Moldovan president and government to reject the 
Russian deal, after initially president Voronin seemed ready to sign the memorandum, hoping 
that Russia will help Moldova to settle the frozen conflict in Transnistria. On June 22, 2006, the 
Russian chief of diplomacy, S. Lavrov, stated that EU could contribute to the peace-keeping 
in Transnistria and it would have certainly already participate ”if id did not broke the Kozak 
memorandum signature”. The statement was recorded at the meeting of the ”Weimar triangle” 
(France, Germany, Poland – since 1991), where Russia participated for the first time. http://
www.interlic.md/2010-06-23/lavrov-ue-poate-participa-la-operatiunea-de-mentinere-a-pacii-
intransnistria-16414.htm (accessed on 17.07.2010). 
3 Former Romanian minister of Foreign Affairs Adrian Cioroianu mentions the hypothesis 
that the rejection of the Kozak memorandum was the outcome of the US-EU combined pressures at 
Romania’s suggestion, and that Voronin may have hoped that since Romania would enter the EU, 
the Transnistrians would be attracted by economic prosperity and accept to come back to Moldova. 
However he said he does not believe Voronin really thought this possible. Adrian CIOROIANU, 
”Ghiuleaua rusească de la glezna Moldovei”, Foreign Policy (Romania), May-June 2010, p. 55.
4 Armand GOŞU, ”Politica răsăriteană a României 1990-2005”, Contrafort, no. 1 (135), 
January 2006, http://www.contrafort.md/2006/135/958.html (accessed on 20.07.2010). The 
author is very firm when declaring that ”During a decade and half, Romania had an Eastern 
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Former President V. Voronin frequently labeled Romania as an ”imperialist” state, 
an aggressive ”big brother” trying to impose its will to Moldova and interfering in 
domestic politics. Moldovan communist authorities complained before European 
institutions about Romanian behavior. They also condemned Romania’s policy of giving 
citizenship to many Moldavians, considering this a strategy for controlling Moldova as 
a state and reducing its sovereignty. In 2001-2002, there were expulsions of diplomats 
and various accusations made by Chişinău, some of them purely ridiculous. 
Between 2004 and 2006 there has been a period of ”illusionary friendship” tu 
quote well-known analyst Victor Chirilă1.
In December 2007, President Voronin send a letter to all the EU head of states 
complaining about Romania’s ”evil” practices and called Romania the biggest threat 
for his country.
In April 2009, as their legitimacy clearly diminished, the communist officials in 
Chişinău accused Romania of fomenting the bloody revolt of the democratic youth in 
the capital city2, but there was no real proof of this and the international community 
recognized the innocence of Romania. More likely, the CPRM in fact tried to find a 
scape-goat to divert the popular unhapiness, generated by its failing socio-economic 
politics, to a foreign threat.
Although President T. Băsescu pledged that Romania will continue to recognize 
the territorial integrity and statehood of Moldova, in his message in front of Parliament 
reunited Chambers (14 April 2009): 
”Romania supports unconditionally Moldova – he hold that there is only 
one Romanian people and that the existence of the Moldovan Communist regime 
is an evil in itself that the Moldovan youth must discard! The crimes committed 
by representatives of the Moldovan regime, once established, should be subject 
to international criminal justice”3.
A more sensitive issue involving Romania, Moldova and the EU was the 
intensification of the process of granting citizenship to Moldovans. Following the harsh 
actions of the Moldovan communist authorities against the protesting civilians in April 
2009, President Băsescu decided to allow a much bigger number of citizens-making, 
but this triggered a reaction of mistrust and dissatisfaction from representatives of 
some EU members. Czech Republic who had the rotative EU presidency through the 
voice of its chief of diplomacy suggested that Romania should not use this way to 
policy without consistency and without vision”. The reason is that Romania focused only on 
Euro-Atlantic integration and ”this exhausted its diplomatic capacity”. He insists that Romania 
does not have neither a tradition of an active eastern foreign policy nor enough well prepared 
experts for this area.
1 Victor CHIRILĂ, ”Republic of Moldova Relations…cit.”, p. 28. 
2 The so-called ”twitter-revolution” was the effect of the revolt of the democratic youth 
in Chişinău against the electoral fraud commited by the communists during the April 2009 
elections. When new elections were eventually organized the communist lost the power in 
favor of a democratic coalition of more pro-western parties. One can see an influence of the 
Ukrainian scenario – the elections won in 2004 by pro-Russian Ianukhovich were contested by 
the population in Kyiv for reasons of massive fraude and new elections immediately organized, 
won by the pro-western candidate Yushchenko. 
3 Message of the Romania’s president in front of the two Chambers of the Parliament, 11 
April 2009, www.presidency.ro (accessed on 17.05.2009). 
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create a big number of EU citizens as this would have destabilizing effects on the 
EU and the Eastern Partnership that was just launched by the EU. A huge number 
of Moldovan-Romanian citizens would come in the West asking for low-paid jobs, 
endangering the socio-economic situation of these states. German diplomats also 
spoke about the risk of introducing Moldova on the EU ”using the back door”1. 
Thus, one can say that Romania’s strategy of getting closer to Moldova, affirming 
the principle ”one nation two states”, preparing Moldova for EU membership by 
regarding is as a ”Balkan state” provoked opposed reactions from Chişinău at least 
between 2001 and 20092. The communist leadership adopted the slogan ”two nations, 
two states” and hanged on the so-called ”Moldovan” identity, an inheritance of the 
Soviet times. The new government which took the power in 2009, in fact a coalition of 
political parties called The Alliance for European Integration, made significant steps 
in the direction of Romania. 
Even if there is not a consensus in favor of the unification (the President 
Ghimpu, known as an ”unionist”, anyway stated that there is no such a perspective 
on the short term), neither for condemning Communism as a criminal regime (the 
attempt to commemorate the ”day of the Soviet occupation” in June 2010 failed as 
the Constitutional Court declared the presidential decree as invalid3), some steps 
were done such as the removal from the Moldovan official sites of the mention of 
”Moldovan language”, the removal of barbed wire from the Romanian-Moldovan 
border, the signing of the trans-border trade agreement etc. The government in 
Chişinău seems to have understood that there is no chance for Romania to agree 
to sign a Basic Political treaty with Moldova. First, as all the Romanian officials 
since 1991 underlined, Romania does not want to recognize the juridical effects of 
the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact and to make explicit reference to the 1947 Paris Peace 
Treaty. There is also a battle of political myths: between those Moldovans who see 
Romania as a ”protective brother” and condemn the Communist (Soviet) regime and 
ideology, and those who are afraid of ”Romanian irredentism” and believe that in 
fact USSR ”liberated” the land occupied by Romanian forces in 1918 and 1941. Of 
course, Romania wants to contribute to this struggle for the hearts and the minds of 
the Moldovans, but it knows from experience that any direct interference will provoke 
harsh reactions from the anti-Romanian side.
1 Cristina CÂMPEANU, ”Europa presează România să renunţe la Moldova”, Romania 
Liberă, 15 July 2010, http://www.romanialibera.ro/actualitate/europa/europa-preseaza-
romania-sa-renunte-la-moldova-193764.html (accessed on 20.07.2010). 
2 Ruxandra Ivan explains the hostility of the Moldovan government towards Romanian 
policies by the nature of the political regime in Moldova: the Communist ruling party. She 
stated that Romania abandoned for a tome the idea of unification with Moldova because of the 
Russian opposition and the imperatives of Western integration. Unifying with Moldova would 
have diminished the prospects of Romania’s integration with NATO and EU as the member 
states did not agree to the membership of former Soviet states. See especially Ruxandra IVAN, 
”De la discurs pasional la discursuri paralele. Relaţiile dintre România şi Republica Moldova 
1991-2006”, in IDEM (coord.), Direcţii principale în studiul relaţiilor internaţionale în România, 
Ed. Institutul European, Iaşi, 2007, p. 299. 
3 One should mention that one of the coalition parties, the Democrat Party, led by presidential 
aspirant Marian Lupu, has been particularly critical of Ghimpu’s decree, fearing a harsh reaction 
of Russia and the divisive effect on Moldovan population. Some pro-Romanian Moldovans 
consider the Soviet military action of 1940 as an occupation, while others consider the Red Army 
to have ”liberated” the region from fascism, in their opinion embodied by Romania.
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The cooperation should be at the beginning pragmatic, technical, profit-oriented. 
The agreement for small scale trans-border traffic is an excellent initiative which 
already gives results. The opening of two new consulates in Cahul and Bălţi, following 
the visit of Romanian minister of Foreign Affairs Teodor Baconschi, is an excellent 
initiative of cooperation, alleviating the public pressure on the Chişinău Consulate, 
where thousands of Moldovans are making files for Romanian visas. Romania 
granted Moldova a non-refundable aid worthing 100 million euros, for 4 years, for 
infrastructures. It also co-initiated with France the ”Friends of Moldova within EU” 
(The Informal Group for the Support of Republic of Moldova’s European Action) group project 
and granted special licenses for 10 000 Moldovans to benefit from the agreement of 
small border trade. Moldova promised to allow the opening of the Romanian Cultural 
Institute ”Mihai Eminescu” in Chişinău and to broadcast again the TVR1 channel1. 
Anyway, Bucharest should not forget the warning made by former Moldovan 
minister of Foreign Affairs, Andrei Stratan, in May 2006, that Moldova ”needs partners 
not lawyers” for EU integration2. At the same tine, the simplification of the procedures 
of granting Romanian citizenship must be maintained and even accelerated. The 
Moldovan government should be persuaded that this is not a strategy threatening the 
statehood and national security of the Republic of Moldova but a historic reparation 
and an opportunity to get closer to the EU. Romania should anyway continue to be 
the main supporter of Moldova’s EU integration and the interface of EU in relation 
with Chişinău, even if the High Representative for CFSP, Catherine Ashton, manages 
to abolish the post of the special EU envoy in Moldova, as she has proposed in a plan 
to build up the future European External Action Service3. 
Another sensitive issue is the issue of the Metropolis of Bessarabia and one 
could expect Russia to have a distinct view on this one. Russia, through the voice of 
the minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov has already voiced concern about the 
obvious pro-Romanian orientation of the new Moldovan government. 
The effectiveness of the Romanian eastern policy towards Moldova depends on 
many factors: the political will of the government in Bucharest to allocate resources 
and to attract EU attention and funds, the cohesion within the Moldovan government 
(currently there are real divergences among the composing parties on the future of 
the state, the relations with Romania and Russia, the communist inheritance etc.), 
the reaction of Russia and Ukraine etc. A good strategy for Moldova would allow 
1 Andrei Popov (deputy minister of Foreign Affairs and European Integration) in Sinteze 
şi Dezbateri de politică externă, weekly bulletin, no. 35, 11.07.2010, Foreign Policy Association, 
pp. 4-7, www.ape.md (accessed on 20.07.2010). 
2 However, on July 12, 2010, minister of Foreign Affairs Teodor Baconschi said, on the 
occasion of the periodical activity report of the Minsitry of Foreign Affairs that ”we continue 
to be the strongest lawyer of the Republic of Moldova within the EU. Up to now we have 
organized two meetings of the Informal Support Group for Republic of Moldova’s European 
Action, a joint initiative of Romania and France. The first reunion was in Brussels on February 
25, the second on June 14, in Luxembourg, with a numerous participation” – ”Bilanţ de etapă la 
şase luni de la preluarea mandatului ministerial”, 12 July 2010, http://www.mae.ro/index.ph
p?unde=doc&id=44383&idlnk=2&cat=4 (accessed on 19.07.2010). 
3 This point of view is assumed by some experts like Răzvan Buzatu who wants the 
international organizations operating in Moldova to resort to Romanian experts because they 
are better prepared to understand realities in the field than westerners. See Răzvan BUZATU, 
”Expertiză de dincoace de Prut”, Foreign Policy (Romania), May-June 2010, p. 54.
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Bucharest to decisively but not ostensibly supporting the current pro-western 
governmental coalition, taking part in the resolution of the local frozen conflict 
in Transnistria1, favoring the political elites which are in favor of EU integration. 
Romania should strive to get involved again in the peace process, not only through 
the EU which in an observer, but as full fledged actor. Also much more care should be 
given to the process of granting citizenship to Moldovans, as a way for calming down 
the legitimate grievances of some EU states2.
Russia is also watching with mistrust this process and would certainly put 
pressure on the most EU Russian friendly states, namely Germany and France, to 
react to Romanian pro-Moldova strategy. In an extreme case, Moscow could go as 
far as deliberately interfering in Moldova’s domestic affairs to hinder the efforts of 
pro-western coalition. At a moment when Germany unilaterally proposed a special 
partnership with Russia, when the US make all necessary efforts to normalize bilateral 
relations with Moscow, when the EU Special Representative for Common Foreign 
and Security Policy, C. Ashton, is ready to give up the special envoys for Moldova 
and South Caucasus (probably for centralizing the structures of the future European 
External Action Service but possibly also to reduce Russian fears of a too assertive EU 
in its ”sphere of influence”), Romania does have only a narrow range of maneuver. 
No one knows if Romania and Moldova will after some time unite again or not, 
under the reluctant EU umbrella. But Bucharest should make all that is necessary to 
ensure the anchoring of Moldova to the West, its full democratization and cultivate 
the common values of Europe but also the shared ”Romanianess”. Sharing economic 
benefits with Moldova such as energy access is also vital for Romania as a tool for 
gaining legitimacy and credibility. 
1 There are some Romanian scenarios for solving the Transnistrian frozen conflict: from 
federalism, Cyprus-like solution to the extreme solution: Moldova giving up Transnistria in 
exchange for unification with Romania and EU membership. As an example, A. Cioroianu 
thinks that it would be a good idea for Moldova to renounce temporarily or definitively to 
Transnistria. Adrian CIOROIANU, ”Ghiuleaua rusească...cit.”, p. 55.
2 In July 2010, an article criticizing the ”bad” practice of granting citizenship for Moldovans 
by Romania appeared in the German journal Der Spiegel, reflecting the fear that thousands 
of Moldovans will come in Western Europe and take the jobs of the natives. On July 19, Il 
Giornale published an article by Gian Micalessin accusing Romania for illegally and immorally 
transforming Republic of Moldova into the 28th member of the EU by granting European 
citizenship to too many Moldovans. The two new Romanian consulates in Bălţi and Cahul 
are the reason of this vehement reaction. ”We are 28 member states within EU and we did not 
even knew it! Bucharest is taking care to give the EU as gift, a new, invisible and unwanted 
member state. Plus a lot of immigrants ready to move in.” Trying to defend Romania’s 
position, Teodor Baconschi explained that Spain grants citizenship to more Moroccans, each 
year, than Romania do to Moldovans but this argument did not change the tone of western 
accusations targeting Romania. This western fear seems exaggerated since between January 
and June 2010 only 10,000 Romanian passports were delivered to Moldovans. As journalist 
Sabina Fati emphasized one would need 100 to 300 years to turn all the Moldovans into 
Romanian citizens! See Gian MICALESSIN, ”Passaporti Regalati, Moldavi Pronti a Invaderci”, 
Il Giornale, 19 July 2010, http://www.ilgiornale.it/esteri/passaporti_regalati_moldavi_pronti_
invaderci/19-07-2010/articolo-id=461777-page=0-comments=2 (accessed on 20.07.2010), and 
Sabina FATI, ”Exodul moldovenilor. De la panică la dezinformare”, România Liberă, 22 July 
2010, http://www.romanialibera.ro/opinii/editorial/exodul-moldovenilor-de-la-panica-la-
dezinformare-194414.html (accessed on 23.07.2010). 
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Rethinking the Relation with Ukraine
Retrospectively looking, after the collapse of the USSR, it was almost impossibly 
for Romania and Ukraine to have immediately good relations. Since Ukraine inherited 
Romanian historic territories, illegally taken away by the USSR in 1944-1948, the field 
was rape for a more or less acute conflict. The bilateral relation has been characterized 
since the beginning by disputes, thorny issues, mistrust and mutual accusations. 
Ukraine was a newly born state, excepting the brief period after WWI, when an 
independent Ukrainian state existed for some years before being annexed by the 
Soviet Union. The theory of conflict in strategic studies posits that conflict in a dyadic 
configuration is more likely if the two actors are neighbors, they have contentious 
issues, hostile intentions and material capabilities for war. This was the situation 
between Kyiv and Bucharest in the first years following the collapse of communism. 
After 1991, Ukraine became the owner of some pieces of Romanian territory, 
abducted by the Soviet Union during the years 1940, 1944 and 1948, the northern 
Bukovina, Bessarabia Southern, Herţa region and, not least, the Serpents’ Island. 
Under international law, after the demise of the USSR in the context of political 
relations and the Warsaw Pact (May 14, 1955 to July 1, 1991), Serpents’ Island could 
have returned to Romania, if the Ukrainian authorities wanted to normalize their 
relations with Romania.
In 29 November 1991 the Romanian government made a Declaration stating that:
”The recognition of Ukraine’s independence and desire to develop 
mutually beneficial Romanian-Ukrainian relations do not entail recognition of 
the inclusion in the territory of the new newly independent Ukrainian state of 
northern Bukovina, the Herţa region, the Khotyn region or the region or the 
region of Southern Bessarabia, which were forcibly annexed by the USSR and 
thereafter incorporated into the territorial structure of Ukraine on the basis of the 
Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact”1.
Ukraine rose during negotiations with the Romanian, the issue of the succession to 
the former USSR, claiming it was not its fault if it owned former Romanian territories, 
as they were inherited from the USSR. 
1 See the ”Declaration of the Romanian Government”, România Liberă, 29 November 1991 
(accessed on June 1998). See also Dominuţ PĂDUREAN, Insula Şerpilor, Editura Muntenia, 
Constanţa, 2004, p. 442. According to the Romanian declaration ”taking into account that 
this referendun will have to be hold also within the Romanian territories, Bukovina, Herţa 
County, Khotyn County and the districts from Southern Bessarabia, the Romanian Parliament 
solemnly declares that those territories were broken apart from the country’s body, and the 
Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact has been considered void, ab initio, by ths USSR on 24 December 1989 
and by the Romanian Parliament on June 24, 1991. Certainly, Ukraine has the right to organize a 
referendum for its independency but this referendum cannot be valid regarding the Romanian 
territories abusively annexed by former USSR, territories which did not ever belong to Ukraine 
and which de jure belong to Romania”.
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One has the right to question the good faith of the legality argument as it appears 
that: 
”The act which led to the creation of Soviet Russia, namely the USSR, 
contains no clause of transmissibility of the USSR by any of its components; 
the lack of some nominal inheritance clause has the result that Ukraine cannot 
invoke any legal right to justify the annexation of Romanian territories.”1 
 
Ukraine and Russia, when they signed the convention regarding the Serpents’ 
Island through which Ukraine received this Soviet territory, practically did not 
respect Romania’s right, stipulated by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(1969) which is clear that a treaty will not create rights and obligations for a non-
signatory third state. On the other side, Ukrainian foreign policy experts wondered 
why Romania did not claim these territories directly from the USSR, before they were 
transferred to Ukraine.
Romania and Ukraine opened in 1995 the bilateral negotiations, in order to sign 
a basic treaty on good relations and neighborhood, the regime of the state border 
including of the maritime border, as the treaty concluded with the former USSR in 
1961 came to an end. Since the beginning it was obvious that the tow states positioned 
themselves to history in a diametrically opposed configuration: while Romania 
asked for a clear denunciation of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, Ukraine rejected 
this proposition and suggested Romania has territorial claims. Kyiv also rejected 
Romania’s requirement to introduce in the treaty’s text a clause stipulating that 
”the parties do not have and will not have any territorial claim regarding the 
common border, as it has been defined by the Peace Treaty of 1947 and by the 
Final Act of Helsinki in 1975”2. 
Kyiv rejected also this proposal, as it considered it to be a ”trap” that Romania 
prepared to recover the Serpents’ Island, a territory the Soviets took from Romania a 
year after the Paris peace treaty of 1947 and without any legal basis. 
Eventually, on June 2, 1997, in Neptune, the bilateral treaty of cooperation and 
good neighborhood relations was officially signed between Ukraine and Romania. 
The main explanations for Romania’s decision to agree with a text which practically 
allowed Ukraine to keep the Romanian territories (northern Bukovina, Bessarabia 
and southern Herţa, the Serpents’ Island) with a legal justification were structured 
around the preparation for NATO membership (one of the requirements being the 
good relations with the neighbors), the fear produced by the imprevisible evolutions 
in Russia, the economically difficult situation of Romania, a country which needed 
stability to attract foreign investors. President Emil Constantinescu who took the 
power on behalf of the Democratic Convention at the end of 1996 was eager to make 
Romania a credible partner for NATO enlargement; he also announced a new strategy 
for the Eastern countries. Especially he wanted to put an end to the deadlock which 
characterized the Romanian-Ukrainian relations between 1992-1995.
The opinions among the political class and the public opinion were highly divided 
during the years 1991-1997 and even after that. Some of them went as far as suggesting 
1 Dominuţ PĂDUREAN, Insula Şerpilor, cit., p. 439 (our transl.).
2 Ibidem, p. 448. 
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Romania should claim back those territories and put heavy pressures on Ukraine. 
Others asked for a more nuanced approach, Romania giving up these territories in 
exchange for the political-civic guarantees for ethnic Romanians living in Ukraine 
and economic advantages. Because the public opinion in Romania is generally not 
very interested in foreign policy, the treaty was agreed and signed without generating 
wide protests. Anyway, as foreign policy analyst Ruxandra Ivan correctly observed, 
the signature of this treaty 
”split the public opinion into those in favor of the overcoming of the past, who 
also sustained the Treaty as a means of showing our good will to NATO and those 
who considered it a historical treason of the Romanian ideal of re-unification and 
of the Romanians that live nowadays in Ukraine”1. 
In late January 1997 at the Summit in Davos, President Emil Constantinescu talked 
of a ”historic sacrifice” that the Romanian people did in order to get closer to the West. 
Within the basic treaty there was a mention that in a two years time the countries 
should agree and sign a border treaty including the maritime space. As Ukraine 
always feared the Romanian territorial claims regarding the Serpents’ Island, Kyiv 
managed to tergiversate the negotiations process, thus, between 1991-2003 the border 
sea regime was based on the official documents signed by USSR and Romania.
From 1998 until 2004, Romania has conducted 34 rounds of negotiations with 
Ukraine regarding the conclusion of the Treaty on State Border Regime, Collaboration 
and Mutual Assistance in border issues. From them, 24 were at the level of delegates 
and 10 at the level of experts within Ministries of Foreign Affairs. 
In February 2009, the long standing trial between Romania (as a claimer) and 
Ukraine (as a defender) before the International Court of Justice regarding the fate of 
the continental shelf and territorial sea of the Serpents’ Island resulted in a historic 
”Romanian victory” (according to our mass media), as Romania received about 80% 
of the disputed areas. The international judged acknowledged what it was obvious: 
the Serpents’ Island is not an inhabited Island in spite of Kyiv’s desperate efforts to 
build there banks, offices, hospitals etc. It is a savage rock and should not receive 
territorial sea and continental shelf. However, the oil and gas which are there, in 
the continental shelf (the Romanian media spoke about 70 billion c.m. of gas and 12 
million tons of oil, but the real amount is still unknown), could solve the domestic 
needs of our country for some time. 
As a general rule, the difficult situation inherited from recent history prevented 
Romania and Ukraine to be more committed to the normalization of their relations. 
As a rational actor, Romania understood that a strong a viable Ukrainian state 
is a vital piece in the new geopolitical puzzle as a counter-weight to the possibly 
reemerging and assertive Russia. As Ukraine, under President Leonid Kuchma at the 
beginning showed a certain pro-West enthusiasm, through NATO’s Partnership for 
Peace activities and the special relation with Poland, Romania should had normally 
seen Ukraine as a potential ally. Ukraine is a ”weak” state, as it has been since the 
beginning. With a population ethnically composite and with loyalties split between 
Russia (the Russophones orthodox Christian from the East) and the West (mainly 
1 Ruxandra IVAN, ”Patterns of Cooperation and Conflict. Romanian-Ukrainian Bilateral Relations, 
1992-2006”, Studia Politica. Romanian Political Science Review, vol. VII, no. 1, 2007, pp. 133-153.
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the Greco-Catholic Slavs from the West), with a weak economy relying too much on 
heavy industries and mining, with a real deficit of raw energy resources (oil and gas), 
Ukraine seems more and more difficult to govern effectively and to find its own way 
between a much more assertive Russia and the western pole (EU and NATO) which 
is unlikely to enlarge more to the East in the near future, but it’s a strong attraction 
element for the western Greco-catholic Ukrainians.
Romania clearly supported Ukraine for NATO membership, at least since President 
Băsescu took the power at the end of 2004. At the NATO summit in Bucharest in April 
2008, Ukraine and Georgia were mentioned in the final communiqué as future members 
of the Alliance, though they did not receive the Membership Action Plan (MAP) because 
of the opposition between the adepts of enlargement (US, Poland, Baltic states, Romania) 
and opposing states (Germany, France). Anyway, the special relationship between 
Presidents V. Yushchenko and T. Băsescu, based on friendship and mutual respect, and 
on their strong western commitment plus lack of confidence in Russia, did not brought 
a real improvement in the bilateral relations. More than that, some Ukrainian officials 
went as far as stating that the main sources of threats for their countries were Romania 
and Russia1! Accidental events like the famous case of espionage – the Bulgarian-
Ukrainian network around the Romanian non-commissioned officers spy Floricel 
Achim – unveiled in March 2009, increased the perception of hostility between the two 
countries and allowed the ”hawks” within the state apparatus of both states to ask for 
more security enhancing measures. Romania expelled Ukrainian diplomats and Kyiv 
also expelled two Romanian staff from the embassy, invoking a violation of the Vienna 
convention on diplomatic and consular law2.
The reasons for the non-concordance between Yushchenko’s words and facts 
may lye in the domestic politics of Ukraine, generally chaotic and conflictual3. The 
1 In May 2009, Yuri Ekhanurov, the Ukrainian minister of Defense stated that Russia and 
Romania are possible threats for Ukraine because they have territorial claims, according to the 
Ukrainska Pravda. It seems that Ekhanurov tacitly referred to a declaration of Traian Băsescu in 
2008 who said that there were political forces in Ukraine who had claimed Transnistria for a 
future unification with Ukraine but ”these forces forgot that in this case the South of Ukraine 
would come back to the Republic of Moldova”. Ukrainian and Russian medias commented that 
it was about a part of the Odessa region, including the Cetatea Albă (Blegorod-Dnestrovsk). 
Also in March 2009, when the famous case of espionage (the Floricel Achim’s network made of 
Bulgarians and Ukrainians) within the Ministry of Defense in Romania became notorious, two 
Ukrainian staff from the embassy in Bucharest had been expelled from Romania. The diplomatic 
incident tensed even more the Romanian-Ukrainian relations. See ”România şi Rusia sunt 
posibili inamici ai armatei ucrainene, spune ministrul apărării de la Kiev”, Ziarul de Iaşi, 22 May 
2010, http://www.ziaruldeiasi.ro/national-extern/romania-si-rusia-sunt-posibili-inamici-ai-
armatei-ucrainene-spune-ministrul-apararii-de-la-kiev~ni5fpv (acccessed on 10.07.2010).
2 It seems that the informations stolen from Romania were given to somebody from Russia. 
According to the Ukrainska Pravda quoted by News In, Ukrainian diplomats said that the two 
Romanian diplomats, Radu Filip and Iustinian Focşa, have supported and financed NGOs (cultural 
groups) of the Romanian minority who deployed ”subversive anti-Ukrainian activities”, favoring 
”separatist tendencies”. Ionel DANU, ”Scandalul spionajului: doi diplomaţi români expulzaţi din 
Ucraina”, Adevărul, 6 March 2009, http://www.adevarul.ro/actualitate/eveniment/Scandalul-
spionajului-diplomati-expulzati-Ucraina_0_74394936.html (accessed on 10.07.2010).
3 See the presentation of Ukrainian domestic chaotic politics and its turbulent relation 
with NATO in Serghei TOLSTOV, ”Criza economică, politică şi geopolitică”, Foreign Policy 
(Romania), March-April 2009, p. 79. 
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coalition of Yushchenko and Timoshenko finally disappeared and they became 
adversaries, while the main contender for the presidential function, the pro-Russian 
V. Yanukovych and his Party of Regions has been on an ascendant trajectory and 
eventually took the power in February 2010. The process before the International 
Court of Justice that Ukraine lost in face of Romania generated a wave of accusations 
between the coalition of Prime Minister Iulia Timoshenko and the president’s Party of 
Regions, plus the Communists, the later accusing the president for a conspiracy with 
Romania as a price for NATO membership!
This is a real paradox: the pro-western Yushchenko and his initial ally, 
Timoshenko, which needed Romanian support for NATO membership, did not 
manage to normalize the relations with Romania, because of the chaotic political 
landscape at the domestic level, their nationalistic electorate and the lack of will and 
energy1. Băsescu and Yushchenko set up in 2005 the Joint Presidential Commission 
for solving the remaining disputes at the highest level possibly. This commission has 
various working groups: one is dedicated to the Transnistrian problem, one is the 
Committee for Security and European Cooperation, Regional and Euro-Atlantic area, 
other for culture and education a.s.o.
The only concrete result was that Traian Băsescu paid a visit to Kyiv in February 
2006 and stated his support for Ukraine during the energy crisis with Russia, after 
Moscow cut the gas deliveries for some time to punish Ukraine for its ”bad” practices 
of stealing gas. Worth to mention that during the August 2008 Russian-Georgian war, 
Ukraine led by Yushchenko and Timoshenko (as Prime Minister) supported Georgia, 
being accused by Moscow for sending weapons and even instructors to help the 
embattled Georgian troops. Yushchenko even threatened Russia with the closing of the 
Sevastopol harbor access to the rest of the Black Sea and asked Moscow to notify each 
military naval action to Kyiv2. This is the reason that many political analysts spoke 
about an axis made by Georgia-Poland-Romania and Ukraine, all of them opposing 
Russian interests in the Greater Black Sea Area. All of them cooperated for balancing 
Russia, of course a strategy of ”soft balancing”3 rather than hard balancing. This is the 
1 Trying to explore the main features of Ukrainian foreign policy in relation with Romania, 
R. Ivan used for her analyses ”three major variables – historical legacies, domestic regime and 
international environment”. She thought that absent the last two factors, the historical legacy has 
more impact as an explanatory element for the difficulties to build bilateral constructive relations 
between Romania and Ukraine. When the two governments are similarly pro-Western, the relations 
are ”smoother” such as between 1996-2000 and 2005-2006. In fact, we have a different opinion: the 
domestic pressures on weak governments created strong incentives not to make concessions while 
the pro-Western camp did not really made an advantage. Of course, we agree that the international 
and regional environment is important for both countries, mainly their relations with EU, NATO 
and Russia. See Ruxandra IVAN, ”Patterns of Cooperation and Conflict… cit.”, p. 152. 
2 In August 2008, Yushchenko passed a decree that the Black Sea Fleet warships which 
had participated in operations off Georgia will not be allowed to return to Sevastopol., but the 
Duma rejected this act.
3 The concept of ”soft balancing” was used especially by Robert A. Pape in some influential 
articles, to label actions by regional powers like China and Russia to oppose the US primacy 
without properly balancing through military builds up, alliances etc. Soft balancing means 
doing gestures of non-provocative opposition, measures that do not directly challenge American 
military preponderance but only use international institutions, economic tools, and diplomatic 
ways to delay, diminish, and undermine US hegemony. Robert PAPE, ”Soft Balancing Against 
the US”, International Security, vol. 30, no. 1, Summer 2005, pp. 7-45. 
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reason that experts thought that the region ”became more and more polarized”1 and 
two camps nearly emerged. In fact, with the more or less tacit approval of former US 
President GW Bush jr these leaders tried to limit Russian sphere of influence in the 
area. In the end, Ukraine has been the weakest link in the chain, the first who broke 
apart. The death of Polish president Lech Kaczinski and most of his staff removed 
other big opponents for Moscow. 
On the other side, the pro-Russian Yanukovych seems more willing to normalize 
the bilateral relations with Bucharest, as he already promised that the civic and political 
rights of the Romanians from Ukraine will be more respected than before! He relies 
on a not so nationalistic electorate, in the Eastern side of the country, geographically 
far from the common border with Romania. And Ukraine currently seems to be in the 
Russian sphere of influence again, as the Duma (Parliament) followed the President’s 
request and withdrew the application to NATO membership. He also prolonged the 
Russian right to keep its military fleet in the Sevastopol harbor after 2017 up to 2042 
in exchange for receiving promises of cheap Russian gas, a point of harsh contention 
between former President Yanukovych and Russian president and then Prime Minister 
Putin. He also decided to bestow the title Hero of Ukraine on two anticommunist 
nationalist leaders that Yushchenko granted in 2009, also he wants to grant again the 
official status of the Russian language, after Yushchenko denied this and promoted 
Ukrainian language. His anti-nationalist feelings and pro-Russian stance will further 
divide the public opinion.
Confident on Russian support, Yanukovych seems to be ready to improve the 
relations of his country with Romania. Another points of disputes such as the Bystroe 
Channel (a channel near the common border which the Ukrainians are working at 
to make him navigable and avoid the taxes paid by transiting the Danube-Black 
Sea channel of Romania), the Krivoi Rog factory (where Romania invested a lot of 
money and human capital during the communist time), the Maican Island (a very 
little island – 1500x800 meters – between Chilia and Vilkovo, it belongs to Ukraine 
and Kyiv thinks that Romania wants to take it, as a guarantee for having a border on 
the navigable channel there)2. There are western analysts who see Yanukovych as a 
”Ukrainian Nixon”, able to ”reposition Ukraine in geopolitical terms”, thus bringing 
Ukraine “closer to the EU than his predecessor Viktor Yushchenko”3.
A pragmatic cooperation with a country led by a government which is playing 
the Russian card is not easy but it is still feasible. It is conceivable that Ukraine will 
1 Ruxandra IVAN, ”Patterns of Cooperation and Conflict… cit.”, p. 152. 
2 ”Cui îi va reveni Insula Maican?”, România Liberă, 15 April 2010, http://www.
romanialibera.ro/actualitate/eveniment/cui-ii-va-reveni-insula-maican-183396.html (accessed 
on 24.06.2010). The Romanian diplomacy states that the river-borders between Romania and 
Ukraine should respect the middle of the navigable channel, for the navigable waters, or the 
middle of the water surface, for non-navigable ones. If the navigable channel is modified 
following to ”natural geomorphologic changes” it is possible that this island goes to Romania, 
according to the 2003 bilateral border agreement.
3 According to Andrew Wilson, the Ukrainian leader could do ”In the same way that 
Nixon’s anti-communist credentials gave him the political cover to engage China, Yanukovych’s 
links with Moscow and his support among Ukraine’s Russian speaking population may make 
it easier for him to engage with Europe”. See Andrew WILSON, ”Dealing with Yanukovych’s 
Ukraine”, Policy Memo, European Council of Foreign Relations, http://ecfr.3cdn.net/
b24a1317ca9f7f2b97_5bm6ivzx0.pdf (accessed on 12.07.2010). 
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ask the opinion of Moscow for some sensitive issues with Bucharest, especially 
concerning military aspects, but is will still maintain its sovereign decision-making 
capacity. The problem is that Yanukovych may involuntarily repeat the political 
trajectory of Yushchenko, in that its Regions Party will face a strong opposition from 
the nationalist Greco-catholic electorate led by Timoshenko or by other charismatic 
leader. Any concession make to Romania would weaken the already weakened internal 
cohesion of this country. Thus, either influenced by Moscow or by the desire not to 
excessively angry the domestic nationalists, the decision-making outcomes adopted 
by Kyiv will probably be ”suboptimal”, in that it will reflect a compromise between 
foreign and domestic pressures, not a real rational player calculus. A good example is 
the decision taken in June 2010 by the Duma to grant Ukraine a status of ”neutrality” 
(nonaligned status according to Prime Minister Mykola Azarov) by renouncing to 
any membership in a military alliance but with the possibility to cooperate with them. 
As Russian fleet will remain for another 25 years in Sevastopol and Russian military 
bases will be created in Western Ukraine, this so-called non-alignement will be in fact 
a clear dependency on Russia.
Any Romanian strategy should be based on recognizing the borders, asking 
guarantees for the Romanians living in Ukraine, offering viable alternatives for the 
Bystroe Channel a.s.o. Bucharest should also indicate some red-lines not to be crossed 
by its neighbor: installing Russian basis near the border with Romania, deteriorating 
the Delta environment, hinder the Transnistria peace process etc. One good example is 
the Russian-Ukrainian joint statement over Moldova’s breakaway pro-Moscow region 
Transnistria, on May 17, a text which described Moldova and Transnistria as distinct 
entities1! Romania should send warning messages for such unacceptable behaviors. 
On the other side, Romania should refrain from hostile acts such as declaring that 
Crimea should return to Russia or not recognizing that the Soviet actions in Ukraine in 
1932-33 which resulted in millions of dead were close to genocide by forced starvation 
on Stalin’s orders2! This means that Bucharest must respect the Ukrainian red-lines 
agreed on a rational basis like the non-contestation of the current borders, at least 
if the general international/regional context remains unchanged – according to the 
main general principle of international law ”pacta sunt servanda rebus sic stantibus”3!
One of the predilect fields of cooperation is bilateral trade. Romania and Ukraine 
had in 2008 a total amount of 1991,7 billion USD (1220,6 – the Romanian exports 
1 Gregory FEIFER, ”Kremlin, With Kyiv’s Help, Ups Pressure Over Transdniester”, Radio 
Free Europe, 20 May 2010.
2 The new president Yanukovych does not consider the Stalinist behavior from 1933-34 
as being a genocide. The sociologist Iryna Bekeshkina thinks that the president is splitting the 
Ukrainian society to an unprecedented and very dangerous degree, while Volodimir Fesenko 
stated: ”Formally, the country remains a parliamentary-presidential republic, but in fact we’re a 
presidential-parliamentary system [...] That is to say the main political figure, the main decision-
maker, is now the president”. See Gregory FEIFER, ”For Yanukovych, a fleet-footed dash to 
repair Russia divide”, 30 April 2010, http://rbth.ru/articles/ (accessed on 14.07.2010). 
3 In an interview in July 2010, Romanian presidential adviser Iulian Fota explained the 
frequent anti-Romanian articles published by Ukrainian journals as the logical outcome of the 
new state emerging only 19 years ago, lacking domestic legitimacy and not enough consolidated, 
so, as a diversionary tactic, the Ukrainian politicians turned Romania into a ”regular, day to 
day opponent”, in spite of Romania’s good will and territorial guarantees provided to Kyiv. See 
Sabina FATI, ”Interviu cu Iulian Fota. România, adversarul de serviciu al Ucrainei”, România 
Liberă, 28 July 2010, http://www.romanialibera.ro (accessed on 30.07.2010). 
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and 771,55 the Ukrainian imports) but in 2009 only 746,8 billion USD (455 billion the 
Romanian exports and 291,8 the Romanian imports). The global economic crisis hit 
the economies of both states and reduced the volume a trade to a level inferior to that 
of 2007 (1526,2 billion USD)1. To note that Romania has a constant trading surplus in 
the balance of imports and exports with Ukraine, while this is not the case in relation 
with Russia. It is foreseen that at the end on 2010, the Joint Economic Cooperation 
Commission will began to work again.
A thing is certain: Romania would benefit much more from a stable, democratic 
Ukraine, than from a weak, disintegrating state, with ethno-religious conflict and 
domestic turmoil2. There are strategic scenarios of the breaking up of Ukraine, either 
by the ”Czechoslovak scenario” (peaceful separation) or by the ”Yugoslavian one” 
(armed conflict with identity basis)3. Romania would be directly affected by such 
events, thus it has a clear interest in avoiding such destabilizing processes. 
A huge debate is dividing now political and strategic circles within the EU and 
NATO: on one side, states such as Germany and France would like to agree with Russia’s 
proposal of building a huge European and Eurasian security framework to encompass 
EU, NATO and work on the OSCE pattern but with much more effectiveness. On the 
other side, Poland, Romania, the Baltic States oppose this project as they consider it a 
potential threat for the trans-Atlantic security environment. Russian attitude towards 
EU states will also depend on their behavior regarding this mega-structure of security. 
In case a positive result is obtained, Russia will make pressures on Ukraine and other 
states within its sphere of influence to change their behavior. 
But even in case of a continuous conflicting evolution between anti-Russian 
and more pro-Russian states in the Euro-Atlantic area, Romania and Ukraine 
should ”isolate” their bilateral relations and try to find pragmatic local solutions for 
their mutual benefit. Romania should continue to support Ukraine for future EU 
membership and encouraging cooperation with NATO, but without ignoring possible 
infringements by the Ukrainian government on domestic democratic processes. 
Ukraine is no longer a threat for Russia and this could help promote a better Russia-
EU relation on the long term4.
1 Ukraine, http://www.mae.ro/index.php?unde=doc&id=5750&idlnk=1&cat=3 (accessed 
on 14.07.2010). 
2 Adrian SEVERIN, ”E timpul ca politicienii ucraineni să lase politicianismul”, Foreign 
Policy (Romania), March-April 2009, p. 82. He stated that Ukraine is not ready for EU and 
NATO membership and that Romania and Poland should support the effort of modernization 
and anchoring to the West of Ukraine.
3 The winning of elections by Yushchenko in 2004 has been labelled as ”US-sponsored 
coup d’État” by the pro-Russian parties, while the victory of Yanukovych in 2010 has been 
considered as a strategic victory for Russia, in the eyes of nationalist Ukrainians from the West. 
Ukrainian analyst Stephen Bandera is one of the numerous experts mentioning the risk of the 
breaking up of Ukraine. He even made a play on words (playmanteau) combining the names 
of Yanukovych and Yougoslavia which gives … Yanuslavia! In his words: ”Yanukovych was 
not elected president by a clear majority of Ukraine’s 36 million voters last February. He beat 
Yulia Tymoshenko by fewer than a million votes. Yet he is ruling in complete disregard to the 
regions of the country that did not support him. He has failed to become president of the entire 
country”. See Stephen BANDERA, ”Yanuslavia”, Kyiv Post, 5 May 2010, http://www.kyivpost.
com/news/opinion/op_ed/detail/65868/#ixzz0tkXhk7WG (accessed on 10.07.2010).
4 ”Initial Outcomes Of President Yanukovych’s Foreign Policy: Results Of Expert Poll By 
The Institute Of World Policy” – a conference organized by Alyona Getmanchuk, director of 
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Reshaping the Relations with Russia
The anti-communist revolution of 1989 represented a turning point for the Russian-
Romanian relations because in the following years Russia withdrew more to the East 
after the imperial disintegration wile Romania gradually moved closer to the West and 
prepared its integration within it. 
For an independent observer, the bilateral relations between Bucharest and 
Moscow seem distant and even hostile from time to time1. Russian-state controlled 
media regularly portray Romanian president Băsescu as an anti-Russian ruler and 
obsessed with Romania’s reunification with Bessarabia. But where these relations 
always so tensed during the last century or history witnessed also positive moments? 
Are they tensed because of the characteristics of both countries’ leadership, and the 
political regimes, or because the international system’s structure and the geographical 
facts creates for these countries a propensity towards mistrust, fear and competition?
The main factors explaining the predominantly negative stance of the Russo-
Romanian relations originate mostly in the psycho-cognitive features of the Russian and 
Romanian post-communist leaders, with the foreign and security policy bureaucracies 
in both states playing the role of a conservative structure.
When the Cold War ended, Romania rediscovered its pre-communist independent 
foreign policy and, after some hesitations in the first years of freedom, when it oscillated 
between a partnership with Russia, one with the Balkans states, with the Wisegrad Group, 
or the neutrality scenario2, since the middle of the 90s Romania resolutely turned its head 
towards the West, aiming especially at the EU and NATO integration. Romanian main 
direction of foreign policy was the West, a historic inheritance from the 19th and the first 
half of 20th century, but it also had to manage a dangerous neighborhood situation in the 
East (Russia, Moldova, Ukraine) and a risky situation in the West (Hungary and Serbia). 
Russia has been a permanent challenge for Romania since at least the 19th century. In 
1877-1878, many Romanians imagined Russia could be a powerful ally against Ottoman 
Empire, following the tradition opened by Dimitrie Cantemir, the 18th century Moldavian 
prince, who entered into an alliance with Peter the Great’s Russian empire against the 
Turks. Unfortunately, at the end of the 19th century, the Russians were obsessed by 
the Institute of World Policy, and Sergiy Solodkyy, deputy director of IWP, in fact a public 
presentation of expert poll about the first outcomes of president Viktor Yanukovych’s first 
months of foreign policy. Among the participants were Zbigniew Brzezinski (USA), James 
Sherr (UK), Steven Pifer (USA), Philippe Moreau Defages (France), and Marcin Wojciechowski 
(Poland), etc. http://www.eurodialogue.org/energy-security/Initial-Outcomes-Of-President-
Yanukovych-Foreign-Policy-Results-Of-Expert-Poll-By-The-Institute-Of-World-Policy 
(accessed on 12.07.2010). 
1 A good and very recent example of a hostile act was Russia’s decision to arrest on 16 July 
2010 the Romanian first secretary of the Embassy from Moscow, Gabriel Grecu, accusing him 
of practicing the espionage on Russian territory and trying to have access to sensitive ”military 
informations”. Being declared non-grata, he was to leave Russia in 48 hours. In 2009, Romania 
also expelled some Russian diplomats. See В Москве задержан подозреваемый в шпионаже в 
пользу Румынии, http://www.rian.ru/defense_safety/20100816/265842262.html (accessed on 
16.07.2010). 
2 See Mihail E. IONESCU, ”After the Cold War. The Early Choice of Security Policy – The 
Case of Romania”, at the conference held in 9 December 2009, ”EU as A Global Player”, organized 
by the European Institute of Romania and the Swedish Embassy in Romania in Bucharest.
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territorial expansion in the geopolitical sphere of the Ottomans and were not ready to 
pay a price for keeping their little allies loyal. Thus, the harsh behavior adopted by the 
Russians in 1878, during San Stefano and Berlin congresses, who grabbed territories1 
which had belonged to the medieval kingdom of Moldova, and ”offered” northern 
Dobrogea to Romania in a forced exchange2 – determined a new course of Romania’s 
foreign policy, meaning the secret alliance with Austro-Hungary and Germany against 
Russia. When Romania eventually took sides with Russia against the Central Powers, in 
1916, this was a deeply divisive event for the leadership and the public opinion because 
the adepts of special relations with Berlin and Vienna insisted on the danger that an 
expansionist Russia, dreaming at the Turkish Bosphorus and Constantinopolis, would 
represent for the survival of Romania. They were never convinced by Russia’s good 
intentions, even after the 1914 Sazonov-Diamandi agreement, which would have given 
Romania territories owned by Austro-Hungary as a prize for its neutrality in case of 
war3. After the war, rumors had circulated about Russia’s reluctance to support Romania 
against Bulgaria, an ethnically kin state of Slav origin and a traditional protégé, and 
about Russian Bolshevik’s plan to use force to change the political regime in Romania.
The 1989 revolution generated strange events, with rumors of Soviet spies traveling 
in Romania with obscure aims. Some of them have been shot, wounded and even killed 
by Romanian police forces near Brădeşti (Dolj district), as they came from Yugoslavia, 
but up to know their status is not clear: unfortunate tourists or evil spies?
After the end of the Cold War, Romania has to reposition itself in its relations with 
the still powerful neighbor from the East. Russia was a declining power between 1991 
and 1999 but for Romania it was still too powerful and even sometimes threatening. 
Romanian decision-makers tried first to ensure the national security in a common 
framework with Russia, by eliminating the threats that Romanian behavior could have 
provoked in Russia.
Even if for a lot of Romanians Russia has been a ”pole of repulsion”4, in 1991 former 
President Ion Iliescu tried to link Romania’s fate with Russia by signing a bilateral 
basic treaty (”mutual assistance and support agreement”). By agreeing not to be part 
of alliances labeled as hostile by the other country, this treaty could have prevented 
Romania from joining NATO, at least if not rejected later! But the USSR disappeared 
in 1991 and the Romanian Legislative did not ratify the pact. But why did Romania 
try to have such a legally binding pact with the former empire which shaped its fate 
1 The three districts Cahul, Bolgrad and Ismail, situated between the Danube, Prut river 
and the Black Sea, with a surface of 9642 km2, were taken by Russia in 1878 because they were 
considered as geopolitically important in securing the access to the Danube mouths for the 
Russian fleet. Previously, Russia had been forced by France and Great Britain to give this territory 
to Principality of Moldova after the 1856 Paris peace treaty which ended the Crimean War.
2 Treaty of San Stefano, Encyclopædia Britannica Premium, London, 2005.
3 ”90 de ani de la intrarea României în Primul Război Mondial”, ISPAIM, Occasional 
Papers, 6/2007, no. 9, pp. 40-53. The forceful exchange of territories remained until today in the 
Romanians’ collective memory as a symbol of Russian harsh imperialism and lack of respect 
for the little neighboring countries.
4 This expression was invented by Tom Gallagher, in order to characterize the mass 
rusophoby existing in our country, even if not at the level in Poland and the Baltic states. See 
Tom GALLAGHER, ”Building Democracy in Romania: Internal Shortcomings and External 
Neglect”, in Jan ZIELONKA, Alex PRAVDA (eds.), Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe, 
vol. 2 (International and Transnational Factors), Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001, p. 411. 
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for some long decades? There are several possible answers: either it was a Russian 
promise of support for the Romanian political leaders, or Russian pressures based on 
economic aspects, or Ion Iliescu’s personal preferences for the Russian ”card” (based on 
education, ideology and group solidarity)1, or the fact that, according to Ioan M. Paşcu, 
”the clause was agreed only because (the Russians – my remark) had promised that it 
will be the same in all the treaties with the Eastern states”2. This proposed agreement 
was based on the so-called Kvitsinsky doctrine through which Moscow tries to get sure 
of having good and submissive neighbors. In Central Europe, only Slovakia, during the 
rule of Prime Minister V. Meciar, accepted this doctrine and signed the ”basic treaty” 
with Russian Federation3. On the other side, the Bulgarian president Jelio Jelev in 1992 
unilaterally rejected the bilateral friendship treaty between Moscow and Sophia and 
agreed with a new one at the end of the same year. Thus, Russians could not benefit 
from the ”Kvitsinsky doctrine” and gradually lost most of the control on Eastern 
Europe, excepting the good relation s with Bulgaria and Serbia which were de facto 
under Russia’s protection during the 90s. 
Again, in April 1996, President Iliescu and his staff prepared the field for the signing 
of the Romanian-Russian Freindship Treaty but because of the numerous protests and 
the resistance he met from the political opposition in the Parliament4, the final decision 
was to postpone the signing of this treaty.
On the other side, Romania expected from the NATO countries a certain amount 
of protection, including from the destabilizing pressures from the East. Romania had 
decisively chosen the Western camp in 1999 when it allowed NATO aircraft to cross its 
air space in their way to strike Yugoslavia and at the same time denying Russian ones 
to do the same for supporting Belgrad. At that occasion, Russian decision-makers 
clearly perceived Romania as a western ”pawn”, a perception reinforced by the fact 
that the Democratic Convention, the ruling coalition in Romania between 1996-2000, 
had adopted a very Western-oriented strategy. When the Social Democratic Party won 
the power back, between 2000 and 2004, there was a bigger openness towards Russia 
and the bilateral treaty has been signed and ratified in 2003. Nonetheless, the progress 
was slow and the political and economical relations kept the same low profile as before. 
Especially, Romania failed to improve the level of economic exchanges and investments 
in Russia. When the centre-right coalition led by Traian Băsescu took the power at 
the end of 2004, Romania was already a NATO member, and aimed at protecting 
NATO eastern flank by anchoring the Greater Black Sea Area to the Western security 
1 Th. Tudoroiu adds that in Iliescu’s opinion, only Russia was able to give protection 
against domestic troubles, regional crisis and revisionist neighbors. See Theodor TUDOROIU, 
”From Spheres of Influence to Energy Wars: Russian Influence in Post-Communist Romania”, 
Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, vol. 24, no. 3, September 2008, pp. 386-414. 
He mentions that Romania was the last among Warsaw Pact members who asked for the 
dismantlement of this alliance, and more than that, on December 19, 1991, the ministries of 
defense from Romania and USSR, Nicolae Spiroiu and Evgheni Shaposhnikov signed a treaty 
of military cooperation.
2 ”Discuţia Săptămânii despre relaţia României cu Rusia”, 1st March 2008, http://www.bbc.
co.uk/romanian/news/story/2008/03/080301_discutia_saptamanii.shtml (accessed on 4.06.2010).
3 Janusz BUGAJSKI, Cold Peace. Russia’s New Imperialism, Praeger Publishers, Westport, 
2004, p. 162.
4 Again, the issues of the treasure and of the condemnation of Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact 
were the most controversial ones.
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structures and by internationalizing it. The Romanian president frequently invoked 
the ”internationalization” of the Black Sea, but he always insisted that Romania wants 
positive relations with Russia and Turkey. He called Russia ”one of our friends” and 
Turkey ”one of our allies”, then mentioned that the internationalization of this sea is 
the final aim of Romania’s eastern regional politics1. 
Thus, Russia reacted harshly against this perceived interference in its sphere of 
influence. When Romania accepted to host US forward military bases on its territory 
and later agree to install elements of the anti-ballistic missile shield, Russia perceived 
this as a direct challenge and even threatened Romania with possible military strikes! 
Romania supported Georgia and Ukraine’s NATO membership and the territorial 
integrity of these states plus the Republic of Moldova, thus acting directly against 
Russian interests.
In January 2006, T. Băsescu was asked by the leader of the Russian delegation with 
the Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly which is the reason for agreeing to 
host US military bases in Romania. He answered: 
”As I understood, you represent the Russian Federation. You stayed 30 
years in Romania. We never asked you why!”. 
Of course, this answer produced a lot of critical reactions in the Russian mass media.
In June 2007, the then Romanian minister of Defense, Theodor Meleşcanu, 
proposed to his Russian counterpart to organize together common military exercises, 
possibly in the Black Sea area. But the next day, the Russian general V. Ţamanov, 
counselor of the minister of Defense, said that 
”probably the Romanian minister of Defense does not know history if he made 
such a statement. I want to recall him that, after the decision taken by the Soviet 
leadership, before WWII, our armed forces took part to common military 
exercises with fascist Germany. Everybody knows how that ended: Germany 
attacked USSR”2.
So, Russia dismissed a gesture destined to give an impetus of cooperation, a sign of 
good will, and it was not the Russian minister who answered by his counselor! 
When accidentally Romania held a similar position with Russia, this did not 
contribute to the détente and normalization of bilateral relations. A good example is 
when Romania sided with Russia against the independence of Kosovo but this did 
impress neither V. Putin nor Medvedev. 
As a general rule, the first post-communist decade saw Romania’s attempt to 
normalize bilateral relations with Russia but there were especially historical reasons 
that blocked those plans and the lack of cultural and political affinities3. First, 
1 See ”Traian Băsescu propune internaţionalizarea Mării Negre”, Ziua, Civic Media, Rador, 15 
June 2005, http://www.ziua.ro/b.htmlhttp://www.ziua.ro/b.html (accessed on 29.06.2005).
2 Răzvan CIUBOTARU, ”Răcirea globală a relaţiei româno-ruse”, Cotidianul, 11 June 2007, 
p. 5.
3 Cosmin POPA, ”Sub semnul contratimpului istoric”, Sfera Politicii, no. 95–96, 2001, pp. 43–47. 
Popa stated that in 1991 Romania tended to get closer to Russia in security issues, did not ask the 
dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, like others former communist states, thus its foreign policy was 
in a continuum with that of USSR! (p. 46)
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Romanian diplomacy insisted that Russia should condemn the Ribbentrop-Molotov 
Pact and acknowledge the fact that the Romanian treasure is kept in Russia. In fact, the 
bilateral treaty signed in 2003 foresaw the sitting of a commission of historians tasked 
with the study of the Romanian treasure’s fate. But its activity has been discontinuous 
and ineffective, and it managed to be less effective than Romania’s diplomacy in the 
years 60s when Russia gave back some cultural pieces from the treasure1. The joint 
intergovernamental commission for the study of the common historical issues hold 
three meetings in 2004-2006 and then the Russian part did not resume its participation. 
Concerning the treasure (93,4 tonnes of gold), Russia committed itself within the 
Council of Europe to give back the cultural goods it had taken by force during the 
Second World War. 
Moscow, on the other side, was anxious about Romania’s possible reunification with 
the Republic of Moldova. In 1991-92, as in 2009-2010, the Russian media is propagating 
the image of a”hungry” Romania trying to”eat” its small eastern neighbor2.
Another major point of worry for the Romanians was the energy issue. Russia 
discovered after 2000, that it could have a strong leverage on EU states by acquiring 
energy infrastructures in these ones but also by denying them the right to do the 
same in Russia. Romania is taking about 15% of its natural gas necessity from imports 
and Russia is the biggest provider. In 2009 Romania brought 2 billion c.m. of gas 
from Russia and in 2010 this could amount to 4 billion c.m. The total domestic gas 
consumption is about 13,2 billion c.m. per year3. The Russian state-owned giant 
company Gazprom tried and managed to buy shares in companies like Petrotel 
and other Russian corporation bought steel factories and petrochemical ones on the 
Romanian territory. Romania would like to negotiate directly with Gazprom and thus 
eliminate the two intermediaries that operate in this realm and increase the price of 
gas. But few decision-makers want to make the required compromises like selling 
another energy infrastructures and taking part in Southstream project, a big Russian 
initiative for building a gas pipeline crossing the Black Sea and reaching Bulgaria, 
Serbia, Hungary Italy and Austria, and also Greece and Italy. Strangely, Gazprom 
gives the Romanian politicians the feeling that it is a full-fledged international player, 
semi-autonomous from Russia as a state. In fact, the company works for the state, it 
is a tool for a great power like Russia. In January 2009, the conflict between Russia 
(defending Gazprom’s interests) and Ukraine produced a breaking of the gas supply 
also for Romania, and many decision-makers understood that Romania is only a minor 
player in the Eurasian energy game, that Russia used Ukraine to give a signal to the 
Western states and ask for political concessions. Being an EU member is not a full 
guarantee that we will not lack energy in case of regional crisis and conflicts, but some 
of the decision-makers knew that this is not a reason to play lonely games with Russia 
to benefit from its natural energy resources. Preferring Nabucco, the EU project of the 
gas pipeline, became more important that accepting a Russian invitation for joining 
South-stream. To be sure, there are also people who would like to do this compromise 
1 The issue of the treasure has been included only in one annex to the 2003 treaty, just like 
the condemnation of the Soviet-Nazi Pact, together with Romania’s participation in WWII in 
alliance with Nazi Germany. 
2 Janusz BUGAJSKI, Cold Peace... cit., p. 216. 
3 ”ANRE: Cantitatea de gaze importate de România din Rusia s-ar putea dubla în acest 
an”, 3 March 2010, http://www.bloombiz.ro/business/anre-cantitatea-de-gaze-importate-de-
romania-din-rusia-s-ar-putea-dubla-in-acest-an- (accessed on 10.07.2010). 
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with Russia, searching for immediate benefits. Nobody is to be blamed, but the choice 
we make will have deep strategic and economic consequences on the long term!
Bizarrely enough, on January 8, 2009, in a press conference, Russian Prime 
Minister V. Putin proposed to Romania the possibility to directly buy gas, without 
intermediaries. Russians are not against Romania taking part in South Stream and our 
country could even sell Russian gas to Ukraine1! Most of the mass media and political 
analysts considered this to be an attempt to create tensions between Bucharest and 
Kyiv or simply a joke!
Economically, in accordance with the figures given by the Romanian Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, the importations from Russian federation were about 1854,5 
million USD in 2009, while the exports were about 636 million USD. Thus, there is 
a huge imbalance in the payments structure. Comparing with the situation in 2008, 
the total amount of economic exchanges diminished with 56.3%, with the exports 
losing 27.2% and the importations 61.6%2. Romania is dependent on Russian imports 
of natural gas but less than states like Bulgaria and Hungary. Doing bussiness in 
Rusia today is a risk job because the property right are not really guaranteed: the 
huge Yukos company, ownrd by magnat Kodorkovsky, has been ilegally dismantlet 
and shared among other companies and the owner imprisoned after a fake process! 
Thus, Romanian bussinesmen always asked for special guarantees before investing in 
Russia. The Romanian-Russian Trading Chamber, stimulated by the impetus given by 
the government led by Adrian Năstase, in 2001, drafted a strategy for enhancing the 
Romanian exportations in Russia by creating an open investment fund, distribution 
networks and a stockmarket. Unfortunately, these activities remained at a low level 
up today. The maximum success was the setting up by the Romanian government in 
2006 of a credit insurance mechanism based on rthe Eximbank, the Romanian export 
credit agency3. In May 2009, Romania’s minister of Economy, Adriean Videanu made 
an official trip in Moscow and he met Sergei Shmatko, the Russian minister of Energy 
Alexander Medvedev, the deputy-president of Gazprom4. They debated about the need 
to juridically protect the foreign investments, combat the lack of financial transparency 
and the interefernce of the economic mafias and black markets. Of course, the situation 
is better than between 1991-1996, when many ”Russian companies systematically did 
not pay for goods that had already been imported”5 and the courts were not willing 
or able to make justice for the losing foreign bussiness.
Romania through the voice of its President stated against the Russian proposed 
European-Eurasiatic security organization to encompass all the existing cooperative 
organizations there (NATO, OSCE, SCO etc.) Even the 2010 memorandum between 
German Chancellor Merkel and Russian president Medvedev proposing the creation 
of EU-Russia security commission has been received with mistrust, which is quite 
normal because it was not a common EU initiative but a German unilateral one. As 
rumors circulated about Germany’s proposal that Russia receive visa-free regime for 
its citizens traveling in the EU in exchange for the withdrawal of Russian troops from 
1 Răzvan CIUBOTARU, ,”Oferta lui Putin. România în South Stream”, Cotidianul, 8 January 
2009, http://old.cotidianul.ro/oferta_lui_putin_romania_in_south_stream-69503.html (accessed 
on 10.07.2010).
2 http://www.mae.ro/index.php?unde=doc&id=5698&idlnk=1&cat=3 (accessed on 10.01.2010). 
3 Theodor TUDOROIU, ”From Spheres of Influence to Energy Wars...cit.”, p. 392.
4 http://moscova.mae.ro/index.php?lang=ro&id=13736 (accessed on 10.07.2010). 
5 Theodor TUDOROIU, ”From Spheres of Influence to Energy Wars...cit.”, p. 392.
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Transnistria, Romanian decision-makers included in the National Defense Strategy 
draft, unveiled in July 2010, a paragraph stipulating that 
”the presence of foreign troops near Romania’s borders without the host country’s 
approval constitute a threat to national security”1. 
This means that Romania will be more vocal in asking for involvement in the 
settlement of the Transnistrian conflict, a feature which could produce more tensions 
in the relations with Moscow.
There are numerous hindrances affecting the prospects of new improved 
bilateral relations between Romania and its eastern neighbors: some of them are 
psycho-cognitive ones like personal biases and misperceptions located at the 
individual level2, other ones are at the organizational level – bureaucratic routine, 
specific features within the organizational processes, small decision-making group 
pathologies etc.3. Not to mention the systemic level which affects the relations among 
states in a significant manner. As it is impossible to rapidly and completely change the 
people’s beliefs, norms and values or to wait until a new generation of policy-makers 
replaces the old one, or to hope that the domestic regimes will change their decision-
making procedures, only a gradual accommodation process and mutual knowledge 
mechanism could improve the current situation.
As a general conclusion, Romania needs a strategy for approaching in a unitary 
way the relations with its Eastern neighbors. This strategy should be based on EU efforts 
to build its own direct neighborhood policy and find a modus vivendi with Russia, in 
order to avoid the emergence of a zero sum competition in the common neighborhood. 
If Romania wants to have its own foreign policy profile, as an EU and NATO border 
country, it must have to normalize its bilateral relations with its neighbors, proposing 
pragmatic cooperation especially in soft security and economic realms and allocating 
resources for the projects. Beyond Ukraine, Russia and Moldova, more attention 
should be also dedicated to Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia. Beyond strategic 
energy projects like the AGRI (the Azerbaijan-Georgia Romania Interconnector for 
transporting Azeri liquefied gas to Constanţa) or the strategic partnership with Baku, 
Romania should have an integrated vision and long-term goals. As Teodor Baconschi 
mentioned several times, Romania’s foreign policy strategic profile rely also on the 
Eastern Partnership, the EU’s program on enhancing ties with the Eastern flank states. 
Within the EP, the Comprehensive Institutional Building is an important tool for 
supporting states like Moldova and Georgia, which whom Romania has privileged 
relations4. Romania also wants to build an energy partnership with Turkmenistan and 
to attract Kazakhstan in the PEOP project (Constanţa-Trieste pipeline).
1 ”Strategia naţională de apărare”, Bucharest, 2010, http://www.presidency.ro/static/
ordine/SNAp/SNAp.pdfP. 16 (accessed on 25.07.2010). This document is only a draft, to be 
submitted to the public opinion, and then to the Parliament.
2 For a comprehensive description of the psycho-cognitive mechanisms affecting the 
foreign policy decision-making see especially Sorin Ştefan DENCA, ”Abordări psihocognitive 
în analiza de politică externă”, in Iulia MOTOC, Şerban F. CIOCULESCU (coord.), Manual de 
analiză a politicii externe, Polirom, Iaşi, 2010, pp. 195-212. 
3 Jack S. LEVY, William R. THOMPSON, Causes of War, Wiley Blackwell, 2010, pp. 162-185. 
4 The six months report activity of the Minstry of Foreign Affairs, 12 July 2010, http://
www.mae.ro/pdf/bilant_6luni.pdf (accessed on 20.07.2010). 
